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The Pollution Charge System in China: 
An Economic Incentive? 
Yun Ping* 
ABSTRACT 
By adopting both case study and survey methods in investigating enterprises' 
compliance behavior in dealing with the Pollution Charge System (PCS) in China, this 
project found that no matter what the existing fee level is compared to the optimal fee 
level, the enterprises respond to it in an economic way. However, most of their compliance 
behavior and the local environmental protection bureaus' (EPBs) enforcement behavior 
lower both the incentive functions that the existing fee level could have offered and the 
overall effectiveness of the PCS. Thus there is a need for reforms within PCS itself, 
(e.g., removing subsidy and raising fee rate) and institutional reforms within the EPBs. 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
As a national environmental policy, the Pollution Charge System (PCS), has been 
carried out in China for 18 years. Local and international researchers are interested in 
the effectiveness of this "most important market-based environmental policy". However, 
the results on whether or not the PCS in China functions as an economic incentive, 
tends to be conflicting. Past studies have shown that the existing fee is too low. The 
theoretical conclusion therefore is that the existing fee would not provide sufficient 
incentive for pollution control. This study has shown that even if the fee is at the optimal 
level, there are distortions that exist in the behavior of both the enterprises and the 
regulatory bureaus that could lower the incentive for pollution control. 
1.1 The Pollution Charge System (PCS) 
Pilot implementation of PCS began in the 1970s but it became widely used in the 
country only after the Provisional Measures for the Assessment of Pollution Charges 
was issued in 1982. It covers four types of pollution: water, air, solid waste, and noise'. 
The PCS is a two-step policy with a fee collecting system and a pollution control 
subsidy system. It provides for the collection of fees when discharge standards are 
exceeded. These fees are calculated based on the multiple by which the standards 
were exceeded and the volume of wastewater discharged. Payment of the fees is in 
addition to, rather than in lieu of, the responsibility to treat the effluent that failed to 
meet the applicable standards. Eighty percent of the revenue from the fees is designated 
for rebate and subsidy to assist enterprises in the construction of waste treatment 
facilities. The remaining 20 percent is allocated for EPBs use such as the purchase of 
monitoring equipment (NEPA 1982). 
Institute of Environmental Economics, Renmin University, Beijing 
A charge on noise was newly introduced in 1991. This study will focus only on water pollution for the 
following reasons: a) charges on water are more systematically implemented and b) revenue from water 
charges accounts for 60% of the total. 
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1.2 The Definition of Incentive 
In the diagram below, when the charge rate is set at point F*, the optimum pollution 
control level P*(i.e. that which satisfies the profit-maximizing condition) is achieved. At 
that point, the sum of abatement costs and damage costs are minimized. There is no 




P, Pa P* Pollution Reduction 
Figure 1. - Optimal Level of Pollution Reduction 
In China's case, the charge rate is inevitably lower than F*, say it is at Fo. This 
corresponds to pollution reduction level Po. At Po level of pollution reduction, the total 
costs of pollution is not the minimum but the charge rate can still be considered a kind 
of incentive because at any rate lower than point Fo, the level of pollution reduction will 
be lower than Po. This analysis presupposes that the effects of other policies are not 
considered. The most significant evidence of impact of the imposition of a charge rate 
is the dramatic reduction in pollution discharges on those years just after this policy 
took effect. Nevertheless, the rate Fo does not always give the incentives to reach Po. 
The effectiveness of the incentives may be influenced by certain factors. For example, 
if the enterprises expect to receive the 80 percent refund from their payment despite 
the charge being higher than the marginal abatement costs, then they will prefer to pay 
the charges (i.e., only Fo-P1 can be achieved). It is easy to expect that even if the 
charge rate reaches F*, P* still can not be achieved if this factor is considered. Therefore, 
this study assumes that Fo can also provide an incentive toward controlling pollution 
more cost-effectively and identify why Fo-Po can not be achieved. It then suggest 
ways to achieve the move toward F*-P*. 
2 The Pollution Charge System in China 
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1.3 Behavioral Assumption 
A characteristic of Chinese enterprises is that they try hard to maximize production, 
not profit (Jiang 1991). When the planning system was still predominant, the political 
pursuit was the most important factor in assessing the benefits. Output maximization 
was the enterprises' target. With the political and economic reform that started in the 
late 1970s, political ambition was gradually replaced by income motivation. Maximizing 
income (wages and bonus) of managers and workers constitute the most important 
goal of the enterprises' economic activity. Later, with the transition from planning to 
market economy, profit maximization gradually becomes the end goal of production. 
The author also believes that enterprise behavior is determined not only by internal 
motivation, but also by external environment. This includes changing the economic 
system and enforcement by authorities, among others. 
2.0 PART ONE: CASE STUDY 
Case studies in three cities were conducted from June to December in 1995. The 
cities studied are shown in the table below: 
Table 1. Cities where case studies were conducted. 
City Selected Position Province City Size Percent of State- 
owned Enterprises 
Anyang North China Henan Small High 
Changzhou East China Jiangsu Middle Average 
Shundex South China Guangdong Small Low 
The case study focused on two major interest groups-enterprises and the EPB 
(Environmental Protection Bureau, the enforcer of PCS)-even if other sectors were 
also involved. The following institutional analysis provides more details about the PCS. 
2.1 Institutional Analysis 
Several institutions are involved in the implementation of the PCS. Each institution 
plays a different role, and has a different interest in the system, but they must all work 
out a viable compromise for each case. Some are enforcers of the policy while others 
are involved in only part of the implementation. Sohie of them strive for local tax and 
budget balance of the whole city, while others seek to support development of enterprises 
which are subject to them. Each one however seeks to ensure that implementation of 
PCS is somewhat more reliable. 
In this part of the report, all the sectors involved in PCS implementation is described. 
Also discussed is how these sectors relate to each other and form the mechanisms for 
this process. 
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2.1.1 Enterprise 
Enterprises remain the main PCS target. The concern of firm managers has switched 
from output (before the economic reform, in the late 1970s) to profit and the bonus 
requirement of their employees (after the reform). According to the PCS, those who 
produce effluents with concentrations exceeding national or local standards should pay 
a certain amount of pollution charges on a monthly basis. The pollution charge is divided 
into two parts: (1) the normal charges which can be included in the production costs by 
enterprises, and (2) "four small pieces", referring to the fines for the following cases: 
1. increasing the charge rate five percent per year after the third consecutive year 
that the standards are violated; 
2. double pricing when a newly set-up factory (after 1979 when the National 
Environmental Law was promulgated) is violating the standards; 
3. fine for such behavior if the self-reported discharges are less than those found 
by the local EPB in their infrequent, unannounced inspection and improper 
operation of their treatment facilities, etc.; and 
4. interest on late payments. 
The "four small pieces" should be paid using the enterprises' own fund. This 
mechanism is designed to exert more pressure on enterprise to protect the environment 
(NEPA 1988). 
It is easy to see that the pollution charges will have negative effects on the enterprises' 
profit, on their retained revenue, and thus on workers' bonus. Enterprises must therefore 
have the internal incentive to reduce the payment of pollution charges. This can be 
accomplished in two ways: first, by improving the management and reducing the wastes; 
and secondly, by applying technological methods to deal with pollution problems. 
In China, 80 percent of the revenue from pollution charges is refunded by enterprises, 
who pay through grants or loans designed to supplement earmarked pollution control 
projects (NEPA 1982). This encouraged enterprise to avoid paying pollution charges by 
building pollution control facilities. However, with the continuous increase in prices of 
raw materials and electricity, the operation costs gradually exceeded the pollution 
charges, and the attractiveness of getting the subsidies to meet the standards is 
diminishing. More enterprise would rather pay the charges than make provisions for 
pollution control. Nevertheless, with the emergence of the market system and the 
expansion of foreign investment, the environmental performance - more specifically, 
the possession of pollution control facilities - becomes the prerequisite for gaining 
foreign investment and setting up joint-venture investments2. To some extent, these 
motivate enterprises to invest in pollution control. 
2.1.2 Local Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) 
Local EPBs are the enforcers of PCS. They are responsible for environmental 
management and environmental quality of the whole city. The main functions of EPBs 
include collecting pollution charges; organizing pollution control efforts; monitoring, 
2 Interview, environmental engineer, Shunde Silk Plant, Shunde, June 12, 1995. 
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collecting and publishing data on environmental quality; and providing technology 
assistance and training programs, among others. 
Twenty percent of the revenue raised from the pollution charges can be used by the 
EPB itself to purchase large monitoring apparatus and to supplement other administrative 
expenditures (NEPA 1982). However, it is highly possible that self-interest during PCS 
implementation will result in bias in accomplishing the policy goals. 
Environmental protection is a comprehensive effort which requires the support and 
cooperation of government sectors such as financial and industrial bureaus, planning 
and economic committees, and local banks among others. Thus, it is important that 
the EPBs ensure proper coordination among these sectors. They have found that one 
effective way3 to do this is by gathering key persons from all government sectors for a 
"working party" at the end of each year. At that meeting, the EPB expresses its gratitude 
for the smooth cooperation of all the sectors during the past year and informs them of 
plans for the new year. 
2.1.3 Industrial Bureau 
Every industrial bureau manages a cluster of enterprises in similar lines of production. 
In the PCS process, pollution registration or the earmarking of project application of 
enterprises should be approved by the industrial bureaus before their cases are reported 
to the EPB. When enterprises are at odds with the EPB because of such things as 
amount of pollution charges and responsibility for an environmental accident, they turn 
to their industrial bureau for help and protection. On behalf of the enterprise concerned, 
the industrial bureau bargains with the EPB to seek a compromise. 
Generally, the industrial bureaus do not reject requests of enterprises to list proposed 
pollution control projects in an inventory, submitted to the EPB once or twice a year for 
final approval. Usually, the bureaus will improve the project proposal from the 
technological point of view. However, in some cities, each industrial bureau is responsible 
for the allocation of a limited amount of subsidies for distribution to its subsidiaries. In 
this case, the industrial bureau must behave selectively, choosing only those projects 
with greater maturity and net benefits. 
2.1.4 Local Financial Bureau 
The revenue raised from the pollution charges should be transferred to the financial 
bureau every three months, and the disbursement of this revenue (the 80 percent for 
the enterprises or the 20 percent for the EPBs) should be approved by the financial 
bureau. 
As mentioned above, the normal pollution charges can be paid from the production 
costs; after translating to a reduction of income taxes paid by the enterprises. To some 
extent, the raising of pollution charges has negative effects on the fiscal revenue of the 
whole city. For this reason, the financial bureau does not support increases in charge 
rate and the total amount of the charges. In some extreme cases, some financial bureaus 
have set a ceiling level for the total amount of charges to be raised by the EPBs4. 
3 Interview, Chief, Anyang Environmental Protection Agency, Anyang, September 18, 1995. 
4 Interview, chief, Changzhou EPB, Changzhou, April 23, 1996. 
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Because of the EPB's access to 20 percent of the pollution charges, the financial 
bureaus are reluctant to assign adequate administrative expenditure for the EPBss. 
More or less, this influences the behavior of the EPBs when they implement PCS. 
2.1.5 Local Banks 
Pollution charges are paid through the local banks. Each month, the EPBs send to 
the banks a list of the enterprises and amount of charges they must pay. The local 
banks then deduct this amount directly from the enterprises' accounts, and transfer this 
to the EPBs' accounts. Delivery of the subsidy (in the form of grant or loan) for the 
earmarked projects is also done through the local banks and if the subsidy is a loan, 
then the banks are responsible for managing repayment of interests and loans. In turn, 
the local banks charge service fees. 
According to the contract between EPBs and the local banks, the banks have another 
function related to this task - supervising the EPBs' use of the charge revenue. However, 
since the charge revenue does not belong to the banks' own fund, whether or not the 
use is rational does not greatly affect the banks. Thus, this function is not effectively 
performed 6. 
2.2 Compliance Behavior of Enterprises 
Enterprises, comply with the PCS through the following: 
a) pollution registration; 
b) paying charges; 
c) applying for subsidy; and 
d) operating the pollution treatment facilities. 
When dealing with EPB enforcement, enterprises depend on a complicated system 
of interactive, interwoven compliance behavior. 
2.2.1 Pollution Registration 
Under-/Over-reporting Strategy. The basis for calculating the pollution charges is 
the pollutant concentration in the discharge and the effluent quantity. Thus, quality and 
quantity of each polluter's effluent must be determined and constitute the monitoring 
aspect of PCS. If this task were carried out by the EPBs, it would engage too much of 
their administrative capacity. This is why in China's PCS, the self-reporting system is 
employed. The enterprises are responsible for daily monitoring of their effluent 
concentration and quantity, obtaining the monthly value and presenting this to the EPBs. 
Only after the EPBs' confirmation, which often involves the EPB officials' experience 
and the routine monitoring by the EPBs two to four times per year, can the value be 
used as the basis for calculating the charges. EPBs also conduct unannounced 
inspections. If the results of the latter are higher than those self-reported, a penalty 
(double rate or fine) is imposed on the enterprise concerned. The self-reported data is 
directly correlated with the pollution charges paid by the enterprise (i.e., lower 
concentration and smaller quantity mean lower expenditure on pollution charges). This 
is why some enterprises resort to under-reporting. 
s 
6 
Interview, chief, Changzhou EPB, Changzhou, April 23, 1996. 
Interview, chief, Anyang EPB, Anyang, September 18, 1995. 
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When EPB officials confirm self-reporting results, there is a vertical comparison of 
the production-discharge coefficient with that of last month's or last year's results, and 
a horizontal comparison with results of other enterprises having similar production 
processes. This method, to a certain extent, is rational. Unfortunately for many cases 
it fails to be accurate enough to become a defense for the under-reporting phenomenon. 
The irregular, unannounced inspection is thought to be effective in constraining under- 
reporting. However, with the EPBs' inadequate monitoring capacity, inspection frequency 
can not be expected to be high enough to catch cases of under-reporting. To make 
things even worse, even when an under-reporting enterprise is caught, EPB's action on 
the erring enterprise takes several steps thus, giving the enterprise concerned time to 
enter into a bargaining situation; in most instances, the case never progresses beyond 
the first step?. With non-compliance costs being equal to the probability of being caught 
times the penalty of being caught, the low values of these two factors provide the 
incentives for under-reporting. 
There could also be an incentive for over-reporting. According to the PCS, the 
charge is levied on the basis of the pollutant resulting in the highest payment, if there 
are several types of pollutants exceeding the standards at the same time. An enterprise 
can over-report other pollutants as long as the resulting payments do not exceed the 
highest payment, which is what the enterprise actually pays. The advantage in this is 
avoiding the inconvenience of EPBs' unannounced inspection at times of abnormally 
high production, thus causing higher pollution from other sources. 
2.2.2 Paying the Charges 
Bargaining. Owing to the special relationship between the government and the 
enterprises, bargaining is the predominant system in all levels of economic activities. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, it also exists in the implementation of the PCS. Enterprises 
(especially those that are state-owned), with financial problems may ask the EPBs for 
reduction in the total payment for pollution charges. 
Another kind of bargaining is between the enterprises and the industrial bureaus. 
The enterprises may argue that since they have to pay a certain amount for pollution 
charges, theirtax quota should be reduced. Generally, this kind of bargaining succeeds 
because the pollution charges account for a relatively low percentage of the taxes/ 
profits. 
Late payment of the charges. Enterprises with financial problems may owe the 
government overdue pollution charges for months or years. Besides pollution charges, 
they may also have unpaid bills for taxes, water, electricity, and employee wages8. 
Usually when cash flow increases, these enterprises first pay the money owed to their 
employees. Second priority is paying taxes to ensure that they get the bonus for 
accomplishing their contracts. then they pay the water and electricity bills to prevent the 
public utility companies from cutting these services. By the time they are ready to pay 
the pollution charges, money has probably run out. In most cases, even though there is 
a penalty for overdue pollution charges, the EPBs generally exempt interest for late 
payment after they receive the delayed payments. 
Interview, environmental manager, Anyang Chemical Fabric Textile Plant, Anyang, September 22, 1995. 
8 Interview, manager, Anyang Paper Mill, Anyang, September 24, 1995. 
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Intent to pay more than they should. In contrast to the "owing fee" behavior, some 
enterprises in good economic condition, would like to pay more than they should in 
terms of the normal pollution charges9 (i.e., not the "four small pieces"). The normal 
pollution charges can be paid out of the production costs, and the enterprises who pay 
the charges are authorized to get back 80 percent of the charges they paid, for specific 
uses. Thus, paying more means an enterprise gives the EPBs money they should be 
paying the financial bureau in terms of income taxes. This is done because they expect 
to receive the 80 percent refund (see Case Study I for details). In order to accomplish 
the quota set sometimes by the higher level EPBs (i.e., the provincial EPBs) or to get 
the 20 percent of the revenue (i.e., the self-interest motivation), some EPBs (especially 
those who regard raising revenue as their first goal in implementing PCS) tend to welcome 
this kind of behavior. The refunds takes two forms: grant and loan. If the refund is in a 
loan, then an enterprise is expected to pay it back, and cash flow would be different. 
However, enterprises always can get a 100 percent exemption from the debt (for detailed 
analysis see EPBs' behavior). 
2.2.3 Applying for the Subsidy 
Subsidyseeking behavior. The initial refund system has encouraged the enterprises 
to scramble for the subsidy, not necessary for pollution control, but for investment 
purposes, a traditional behavior of Chinese enterprises (Jiang 1992). Even after loans 
were given instead of grants in 1988, the requirements for exemption are so easy that 
the charge hardly made a difference. 
Disregarding the soundness of new projects. In order to get the subsidy, the 
prerequisite is the submission of a proposal for a technological project. As shown above, 
the most important motivation in proposing a project is to get the investment. Thus, the 
project selection and proposal probably lacks complete understanding of the proposed 
project's feasibility and effectiveness. This results in a waste of money. 
2.2.4 Operation of the Pollution Treatment Facilities 
Through nearly 20 years of implementation, the charge rate has been readjusted 
by about 40 percent higher only once in 1991. Because operation and maintenance of 
the treatment facilities has been far more costly than paying pollution charges, many 
enterprises prefer not to operate their facilities at all. For example, an investigation 
carried out 10 years ago on the operation performance of 5,554 sets of wastewater 
treatment facilities found out that only 1/3 were in operation, 1/3 were out of operation 
and another 1 /3 were in operation only occasionally (Li 1992). It is believed that this 
scenario has not improved. In addition, those who continue operation do so not because 
it is cheaper but because of environmental consciousness or political positioning (e.g., 
trying to become a model environmental enterprise). Such reasons can not be easily 
pinpointed and quantified. 
All these are typical ways by which enterprises react to PCS requirements. Obviously, 
some are more relevant to certain kinds of enterprises (i.e. state-owned or TVIEs). For 
example, state-owned enterprises have stronger bargaining power with the EPBs and 
are more likely to owe for pollution charges because of their soft-budget constraints. 
On the other hand, TVIEs are more conscious of the effects of pollution charges on 
their profits since they are facing more market factors. 
9 Interview, environmental staff, Changzhou Liquor Plant, Changzhou, December 18, 1995. 
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Case Study I: An Economic Analysis 
During the case study, a surprisingly popular phenomenon was found: enterprises without financial 
problems thought that as long as their economic condition permitted, they are willing to pay more 
charges than what they should. They described this payment as "just like depositing money in a 
bank". In some cases, this behavior was done depending on the will of the environmental managers. 
With the 80 percent refund, it was helpful for pollution control, for easing work when dealing with 
other units of the same enterprise, and for promoting their reputation within the enterprise. Many 
"smart" directors said that they would like to pay more to the EPBs. Thus the question: What effects 
does the pollution charge impose on the budget balance of an enterprise? The answer may be 
obtained by an analysis of cash flow of a hypothetical enterprise. 
To make things simple many details are omitted in the following equation (without considering the 
pollution charges): Gross Profit =Sale Revenue-Sale Cost-Production Tax 
Assume the gross profit is Y million US dollars and that the enterprise has to pay 100 million 
dollars' pollution charges (or even more). Then the gross profit of (Y-100) million dollars is obtained. 
The income tax is levied on the basis of the gross profit with the rate of 55% for state-owned 
enterprises (before 1994). Following are diagrams of the cash flow of these two options. 
Not Paying the Pollution Charges (or Not Paying More) 




Net Profit (Y*45%) 
(Y*55%)1 
Paying the 100 Million US DOLLARS' Pollution Charge (or Paying More) 










Net Profit (Y*45%-45) 
80% refund for pollution control 
Enterprise's "Net Profit" 
((Y*45%)+36) 
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Obviously, the "paying more" option is preferred since the enterprise can get more 
"net profit". However on July 1, 1994, the income tax rate was changed from 55% to 
33%, and the attractiveness of this option is expected to decrease. Even though the 
subsidy (in grant or loan) is issued in terms of earmarking projects, in fact, many 
enterprises use the money to purchase raw materials, to develop new products, and to 
pay employees bonuses10 . When the money runs out even if the projects have not 
been completed, they simply apply for a next project. The EPBs do not have enough 
personnel, mechanisms, and will to control this situation. 
For the case studies conducted in these three cities, 10 enterprises were investigated: 
four of which are state-owned and six are TVIEs". When these 10 enterprises were 
compared, it was found that the TVIEs' environmental performance was not necessarily 
worse than that of the state-owned enterprises. This finding was contrary to the prevailing 
belief, especially in the light of the finding that the percentage of TVIE treated wastewater 
is even higher than that of state-owned enterprises. Strangely, however, the percentage 
of discharged water that met standards was not higher. This suggests an important 
fact: the production technology and the quality of TVIEs' human resources are less 
developed than those of state-owned enterprises. For example, a TVIE manager of 
Shunde city in Guangdong Province complained in the interview12 that their water 
treatment results were not satisfactory because the operators were not proficient in 
calculating the quantity of materials added to the wastewater being treated; most of the 
time, they added more than necessary. Interestingly, there is another example from a 
state-owned enterprise in Changzhou. The envirormental specialist complained that 
because the price of white lime (CaO) continued to rise, the manager prohibited its use 
and treatment effectiveness reduced. CaO is both a substance used in water treatment 
and a raw material used in the production process. Enterprise ownership plays an 
important role in affecting PCS compliance results. However, no evidence was found 
confirming the claim made by the commentators that the private enterprises are far 
more likely to be caught. Instead it was found that these two kinds of enterprises (i.e. 
state-owned and non-state-owned, including private enterprises) face different levels 
of administrative pressure from the EPBs. More specifically, the state-owned enterprises 
face more stringent enforcement for the following reasons: 
a) State-owned enterprises are still the main policy target of the PCS. EPBs still do 
not have yet the capacity to include in their enforcement many TVIEs or private 
enterprises which are scattered in the area. 
10 
12 
Interview with a group of environmental staff from nine enterprises under the chemistry industry, and the 
environmental official of the Industry Bureau of Changzhou, Changzhou, December 22, 1995. 
According to some, the case study and survey should have included private enterprises. However, the 
average EPB rarely includes many private enterprises, in their enforcement. In another words, most of the 
private enterprises are not re,,uired to comply with PCS. Thus, private enterprises were included in TVIEs 
rather than as a different kinc of ownership. For the characteristics of private enterprises, the writer 
interviewed a specialist from the China Social Academy and learned that private enterprises share many 
similar characteristics with TVIEs (e.g., market pressure). Canerally speaking, the size of private enterprises 
is very small, averaging 470 thousand RMB's registered capital and 15 employees. Economically, they are 
facing discriminate condition on taxes and loan requirements, and image problems (low quality imitations are 
damaging business). The conclusion is that private enterprises would seek to combine with local 
governments when they develop to a certain level and face such problems as human resources and land 
use, and a mixture type of ownership will emerge. 
Interview, firm manager, Nanfang Silk Corporation, Shunde, June 9, 1995. 
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b) Generally, the TVIEs (and the private enterprises) are supervised by county 
EPBs or EPOs (environmental protection office), that are even more dependent 
on the county government for financial support. This is why the bargaining 
phenomenon is even more prevalent. 
2.3 Enforcement Behavior of EPBs 
All the behaviors mentioned above have only one result: lower the incentive function 
from (Fo-Po) to (Fo-P1). Why enterprises behave this way is understandable: they 
can spend less (i.e. benefit maximization). But another question that may emerge is 
why all these behaviors can be effective in reducing the enterprises' responsibilities for 
their pollution. The answers lie in, on one hand, the irrationality and inconsistency of the 
policy system per se, such as the mono-factor of charge determinant and the subsidy 
to the specific enterprises who pay the charges. On the other hand, there is the 
"government failure" of EPBs and other government sectors. 
The behavioral assumption of "benefit maximization" is also applicable for the EPBs. 
With the close relationship between the pollution charges raised by the EPBs and the 
EPBs' survival (Table 2), the EPBs are more concerned with how much they can raise 
the charges than how good is the water quality13. In order to ensure a certain amount 
of pollution charges, EPBs tend to take PCS implementation as their priority taskla 
inputting a large amount of human, physical, and capital resources into it. Even in PCS 
implementation, the EPBs tend to take greater effort in charges collection than in 
charges utilization. Furthermore, during the charge-collection process, EPBs can provide 
enterprises with privilege condition to comply with the PCS. However, it is exactly the 
privilege condition that damages the incentive function of the PCS. 
Table 2. Financial sources of EPBs (10,000 Chinese Yuan 
Sources of revenue of EPBs Total revenue 
Cit f y or use 
Normal Four Grants from by 
Charges small pieces Financial bureau EPBs* 
Anyang 1000 24 96 320 
Changzhou 900 100 20 300 
Shunde 345 300 110 480 
* Total Revenue for use by EPBs = 20% of normal charges + 100% of Four small pieces + 100% of grants 
For example, some EPBs charged only 20 percent of the total amount, which is 
designed to be used by the EPBs, while the other 80 percent is retained in the enterprises 
(Ma Xiaoying's case study, Wuhan 1994). Another example is that some EPBs provide 
opportunities for enterprises to avoid parts of their income tax. According to the PCS, 
13 
14 
In the interviews with the EPBs' officials, some thought that it is important that a certain number of 
enterprises exceed the discharge standards to ensure the charges revenue. 
Interview, chief of the Planning and Finance Division, Changzhou EPB, Changzhou, December 27, 1995. 
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the receipts of the normal part of charges and the "four small pieces" should be different. 
That is to say, if an enterprise has to pay both the normal charges and the "four small 
pieces", it should receive two different payment receipts to be listed under different 
accounts: production costs (before-tax) and retained profits (after-tax), respectively. 
However, intentionally or not, some EPBs (for example, Changzhou EPB) only give one 
receipt even though an enterprise must pay these two kinds of charges at the same 
time15. Then the enterprise, not surprisingly, lists this receipt in the production costs 
account so as to pay less income tax. In a word, the effectiveness of the pollution 
charges is reduced. 
However, the most obvious example is the EPBs' attitude toward the reform of the 
"loans from grants" utilization of the charge revenue. Before 1988, enterprises benefited 
from the charge revenue by being allowed to avail themselves of grants. This 
arrangement however, was widely criticized by many researchers for its low efficiency. 
Then in 1988, a reform known as "loans from grants" was implemented, requiring that 
users of this revenue pay back the amounts used. This reform was implemented to 
reduce the attractiveness of paying pollution charges (see Case Study I) and hold back 
enterprises from seeking the refund. Many foreign experts claimed that this reform 
was a promising step toward cost-effective pollution control (Spofford 1994; Panayotou 
1995). However, did it work? The three-city case study revealed that the reform had 
contributed little or none at all toward ensuring cost-effective pollution control. More 
specifically, the EPBs were mainly responsible for the latter. 
Case Study I shows that under certain circumstances, paying the pollution charge 
is preferable to not paying at all. An example of such a circumstance would be the 
refund of the charges. If the refund mechanism no longer exists (as suggested by the 
"loans from grants" reform), enterprises will be reluctant to pay pollution charges. After 
all, they can bargain with the government, decline to pay, or ignore the bills from the 
EPBs. In this situation, EPBs have two alternatives if they wish to ensure payment of a 
certain amount of pollution charges: 
(1) enlarge administrative capacity and strengthen enforcement by taking those 
who owe the charges to court, or 
(2) continue the existing situation. 
In actual situation, the government is trying to protect enterprise, (especially state- 
owned ones) in financial trouble, by "easing enterprise burdens", even though this could 
be at odds with the basic national policy of environmental protection1B . EPBs, therefore 
can not count on the government to back them up in the first option. Not surprisingly, 
nearly every EPB in the country has taken the latter step, figuratively "walking on the 
old road in new shoes". They give loans to enterprises (which are required to pay 
charges; loans can not exceed 80 percent of the charges) with low interests. Also a 
100 percent exemption is issued to nearly every enterprise with a loan17 . In some cities 




Interview, Chief Accountant, Changzhou EPB, Changzhou, April 23, 1996. 
China's national policy states that economic development and environmental protection have equal priority 
and should be undertaken at the same level. In reality, economic development is the first priority and 
everyone interviewed on this point acknowledged that economic development takes priority over 
environmental protection and that environmental protection will necessarily always lag behind. 
Interview, chief, Anyang EPB, Anyang, September 18, 1995. 
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exemptions. Instead they allow enterprises to pay back their loans by continuously 
paying a given amount of pollution charges even though their effluent can satisfy the 
standards after the project is put into operation18. In fact, it is also a kind of "paying 
more" strategy, which benefits both the enterprises and the EPBs since the amount 
paid can be divided between them again. 
In the three cities studied, the EPBs practices in PCS implementation are similar 
because all must follow the same rules from the National EPA. However, the different 
settings in each EPB cause differences in enforcing this policy and have different effects 
on policy results. 
In the previous discussion about EPB behavior, it was noted that the Changzhou 
EPB is motivated by strong incentives to collect as much pollution charges as possible. 
However, in most of the cases, the results weaken PCS effectiveness as an incentive 
for pollution control. Table 2 shows that less than 7 percent of the total administrative 
expenditure of Changzhou EPB is from the government financial budget. The lowest 
one among the EPBs in three cities studied, this figure could, to some extent, explain 
the strong motivation to distort enforcement of this policy. 
The second factor has to do with the hierarchy in China's environmental management 
system. If a city has both state-owned enterprises and TVIEs, usually there are two 
levels of environmental authorities within corresponding levels of government: EPB is 
mostly in charge of the state-owned enterprises in urban area, while EPO (environmental 
protection office) mostly takes care of TVIEs, which are normally located in the suburbs. 
Corresponding to the county government, a lower level government than the municipal 
level, the EPOs are more dependent on the pollution charges for their own survival. 
Therefore, they are more likely to cause distortion in enforcing the PCS. 
Generally speaking, lower level environmental authorities like EPOs have fewer 
staff and less able human resources than the EPBs. Under this situation, state-owned 
enterprises and TVIEs are not exposed to the same regulatory pressures, leading state- 
owned enterprises to think it is unfair for some of their counterparts (or even competitors) 
to be under easier requirements and looser control. As a result, their incentive to 
comply with the PCS is affected19. This is what happened in Changzhou city. Similar 
complaints about this situation were not heard in Shunde city which has only one EPB. 
Shunde city was recently upgraded from a country city to municipal city. 
3.0 PART TWO: SURVEY 
Interviews with the case study enterprises served as bases for some of the behavior 
patterns explained in the case study report. How widespread are these behaviors? 
What does the effectiveness of the PCS as an economic incentive look like from the 
standpoint of the enterprises, the target of this policy? A survey was designed and 
carried out in Changzhou City20, Jiangshu Province, Eastern China, one of the case 
study cities, with the help of the local EPB. Included in the survey were 110 enterprises 
18 Interview, chief, Changzhou EPB, Changzhou, April 23, 1996. 
19 Interview, with a group of environmental staff from nine state-owned enterprises under the chemistry industry, 
and the environmental official of the Industry Bureau of Changzhou, Changzhou, December 22, 1995. 
20 As suggested for this stage of the study the researcher focused on a relatively narrow area (i.e., one city) for 
better results. 
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(50 state-owned and 60 non-state-owned, including Town and Village Industrial 
Enterprises or TVIEs, private enterprises, and joint-ventures); with 99 received (46 
state-owned and 53 non-state-owned). The survey covered industries such as the 
textile industry, the chemical industry, and the food and drug industry which are the 
main contributors of the wastewater or chemical oxygen demand (COD). The data 
gathered was from 1989 to 1995. 
From the first part of the survey, the researcher derived information about the 
enterprises' behavior patterns and PCS effectiveness. Using this information, attempts 
were made to develop and test models describing these behavior patterns and tentative 
conclusion. 
3.1 Descriptive Analysis on the Survey Results 
This section features an overview of the responses to the questionnaire. It 
concentrates on key questions regarding the effectiveness of the PCS as an economic 
incentive and omits much of the background details (e.g., the attributes of the respondent 
enterprises' size, age, location, and industrial category). However, for comparison, all 
questions were analyzed according to the types of enterprise ownership (i.e., state- 
owned and non-state-owned, with the latter containing TVIEs and private industries). 
Then, a regression is provided, revealing some observations that can only be obtained 
from the quantitative analysis. 
3.2 The Effectiveness of PCS as an Economic Incentive 
When considering the effectiveness of the PCS, the question most likely to be 
raised is: Is the PCS effective in providing enterprises with incentives to control the 
pollution they create? And if it is, to what extent? In order to investigate this point, two 
related questions are asked in the questionnaire. Answers were evaluated to determine 
the enterprises' practical and hypothetical responses to the PCS. 
Table 3. Answers to Q: In practice, how do you comply with the PCS? 
average state-owned non-state 
A. paying charges, with no treatment facility; 27% 26% 28% 
B. paying charges with treatment facilities, 
because of either technological or financial problems 34% 39% 31% 
C. controlling effluent effectively, paying no charges. 38% 35% 41% 
Table 3 reflects the following: 
a) There is not much difference between the two types of enterprises. The majority 
of the surveyed enterprises (73 percent) have had their water treatment facilities 
in place because of the PCS or/and other environmental regulation(s); 
b) Of those with pollution control facilities, only 38 percent have discharges that 
satisfy the national or local effluent standards. The other 34 percent still can not 
comply with these standards because of either technological problems or/and 
financial deficit; 
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c) The percentage (34) of those who have treatment facilities but not operating 
properly is somewhat higher than the percentage (27) of those who do not have 
any treatment facility at all. 
d) The last point is a confirmation of the phenomenon that enterprises are more 
likely to have a treatment facility in place rather than to just pay the charges with 
no investment in environmental protection at all. There are two possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. First, under PCS, paying the charges is in 
addition to, rather than in lieu of, the responsibility to treat effluent which fails to 
meet applicable standards. Besides, along with the PCS, there are other policies 
that regulate the behavior of enterprises' regarding installation of the water 
treatment plant. Second, after the treatment facilities are in place, operational 
costs are higher than the charges. So, although paying charges is much cheaper 
than installing pollution control facilities, enterprises are still investing in them. 
After these facilities are in place, enterprises are in a better position to decide 
whether to continue to pay charges or operate the facilities. 
However, the discussion above introduces another important question: if there are 
other policies that influence the enterprises' decision on whether to control their pollution 
or not, (and in fact, such policies do exist, such as Three Synchronization, Pollution 
Control Within Deadlines), then when PCS effectiveness in providing incentive to control 
pollution is considered, the effects of other policies effects must be net out. This is very 
difficult to do but as an attempt, the following question is asked. 
Table 4. Answers to Q: In your opinion (hypothetically), 
which option is the most effective in complying with the PCS? 
Average state-owned non-state 
A. paying charges 7% 11% 4% 
B. controlling pollution while paying the charges 49% 42% 54% 
C. controlling pollution 26% 36% 17% 
D. never comparing 18% 11% 25% 
The highlights of Table 4 include: 
a) There is a substantial difference in option between state-owned enterprises and 
non-state-owned enterprises, an indication that the type of ownership does play 
a role in determining opinion and real response toward the PCS. 
b) For state-owned enterprises, the percentage (37 percent) of enterprises that 
preferred pollution control was nearly the same as the percentage (39 percent) 
of those who satisfied the PCS requirements through pollution control. 
Apparently, for this kind of enterprise, the PCS is the most effective policy for 
regulating enterprise control of their pollution. The opinions of the other (63 
percent) enterprises are distributed to the other three options, with a majority 
(43 percent) preferring the "paying while controlling" strategy. Thus, enterprises 
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without any treatment facilities and who had to pay the commensurate charges 
also tended to install some facilities while paying the charges at the same time. 
c) For non-state-owned enterprises, the difference between the opinion and the 
actual behavior (compared with the former table) was far more obvious, showing 
that regulating non-state-owned enterprises, the PCS is not the only policy which 
has influence on the enterprises' decisions regarding pollution control. In other 
words, comparing these two points, policies other than the PCS have more 
influence on the non-state-owned enterprises than on state-owned ones. 
d) A large number of the enterprises (both types) preferred the third option, because 
they were after the subsidy from EPBs. In other words, many enterprises 
preferred not to meet the effluent standards, at least to some extent, to enable 
them to keep paying the charges and keep receiving subsidies. The PCS subsidy 
system seems to inhibit its own effectiveness. 
3.3 Main Factors Affecting the PCS as an Economic Incentive 
The last point above is not a new finding. As indicated in the case study report, the 
low fee rate and the subsidy system in the PCS in China are two points that have 
received the most criticism, and the most that need to be reformed. The next topic 
concerns the hypothetical subsidy system. 
Table 5. Answers to Q: Suppose that the government decides to abolish the subsidy 
system, will your enterprise the usage of this fund? 
average state-owned non-state 
A. Increase 21% 20% 23% 
B. Reduce 31% 44% 18% 
C. With no change 48% 37% 59% 
And at the same time, will you intend to... 
A. Pay the charges 15% 25% 6% 
B. Control the pollution 74% 70% 78% 
C. Others 11% 5% 16% 
The following observations were made from Table 5: 
a) A large majority of enterprises (both state-owned and non-state-owned) believed 
that they can control more pollution if the subsidy is removed. It shows that the 
present subsidy plays a role in encouraging enterprises to pay the charges 
instead of controlling their pollution. 
b) About one third of the enterprises would reduce the use of the environmental 
loan (converted from the subsidy) while the other two thirds would either increase 
(21 percent) or maintain present use of this fund (48 percent). 
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c) It should be noted that those who claimed they would reduce the use of this 
fund are not saying that they would reduce efforts to control their pollution. 
Instead, they would turn to other financial sources because many enterprises 
indicated that they would do more treatment of effluents while reducing use of 
the subsidy. 
d) The two types of enterprises continued to behave differently in this hypothetical 
situation. 
Table 5 also shows if the subsidy is removed, the number of enterprises that preferred 
the paying charges option would be reduced. In the next table, one finds that if there 
are fee rate reforms, similar results would be expected. 
Table 6. Answers to Q: If the fee rate would be adjusted upward, will you... 
average State-owned non-state 
A. Treat more pollution so as to 
reduce payment of charges? 65% 60% 70% 
B. Continue to pay charges? 11% 13% 9% 
C. A or B, depending on how much 
the rate would increase; 18% 22% 15% 
D. Others. 5% 2% 3% 
From the responses obtained in Table 6, one could see that: 
a) Majority felt that increasing the fee rate would be effective in encouraging pollution 
control (65 percent). Another 18 percent indicated they may choose not to pay 
the charges (i.e. control their pollution) if the fee rate is sufficiently high. 
b) There is no obvious difference between the state-owned and non-state-owned 
enterprises' reaction to the supposed rate-increase, showing that increasing 
the fee-rate would be effective in encouraging pollution control for both types of 
the enterprises. 
As a conclusion, 76 percent of the enterprises believed that PCS' overall role in 
pollution control is more of enhancing environmental conscience than serving as an 
incentive to pollution control. 
3.4 Regression Analysis 
This part of the paper details an investigation of the consistency between the data 
gathered, the paradigms or theories obtained from the case studies, and discussions 
from the previous parts. An econometric model was used as the major approach. The 
researcher realizes that most of the factors which might effect compliance outcomes of 
the enterprises, (e.g. propensity to pay more than required, EPBs behavior, etc.) are 
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latent variables. Therefore the effects of these variables might not be obtained directly. 
However, it is possible to regress some other variables which might affect the enterprises' 
compliance outcomes more directly. 
3.4.1 Dependent Variable 
This involved the determination of a variable that could stand for the compliance 
outcome of PCS. In water pollution control in China, the NEPA has focused on COD 
control because it is viewed as the most important of the so-called "conventional 
pollutants". Although the EPBs of different cities differ in terms of which pollutants they 
regulate, virtually all cities regulate and monitor COD discharge level. Also, technologies 
that control COD discharges tend to reduce the levels of other pollutants. Thus, if it is 
possible to determine the factors influencing the behavior of enterprises in complying 
with COD requirements, those factors will likely apply to other pollutants as well. Notice 
that through the PCS, NEPA is still regulating COD concentration in the discharges. 
The dependent variable in this regression model is the log of the annual average COD 
concentration (LCOD) in the effluent21. 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables or the main factors hypothesized to affect the compliance 
results include the following two sets of variables: 
a) social economic characteristics of enterprises, such as size, type, economic 
condition, degree of environmental efforts; and 
b) regulatory condition of EPB, such as the frequency of monitoring. 
3.4.3 Model 
Even though the regression analysis could be extremely complicated, static linear 
relationships using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) were assumed. 
The data set is a panel data, and even though several independent variables, (i.e. 
TYPEDUM), have been identified to be the same for each enterprise across the whole 
time period, there are still other unquantified factors such as the abilities of the enterprises' 
chief environmental managers. Therefore, serial correlation of the error term is expected. 
Since the purpose here of the regression is to obtain explanation, rather than prediction, 
the unbiased estimators for the coefficients of the regressors will be achieved by OLS. 
For comparison, estimators from both the Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) 
models are also presented. 
21 According to the research proposal, other variables like treatment rate (i.e., the rate of discharged water 
being treated over the total amount of discharges) and the proportion of enterprises delaying paying their 
pollution charges, are designed to be used as dependent variables, for comparisons. However, in the data 
collecting stage, it was found that the data on those delaying payment of pollution charge is difficult to get, 
especially for the non-state-owned enterprises because of the bargaining process between enterprises and 
the EPBs on the amount of pollution charges paid. As for the treatment rate, it turned not to be relevant to 
the goal of PCS. From the data of the surveyed enterprises, the treatment rate of non-state-owned 
enterprises was far higher than that of the state-owned ones, but the COD concentrations were still lower 
than those of state-owned enterprises. 
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Table 7. Definition of the independent variables22 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
General attributes TYPEDUM dummy variable on the ownership: 1 for state-owned and 0 for non-state-owned 
of enterprises' OUTPUT physical outputs of enterprises in 10,000 Yuan, showing the size effects23 
LOSSDUM dummy variable for enterprise's economic condition, 1 for loss and 0 for non-loss 
CHEMICAL dummy variable for chemical industry enterprises 
DRUG dummy variable for drug industry enterprises 
TEXTILE dummy variable for textile industry enterprises 
MECH dummy variable for mechanical industry enterprises 
FOOD dummy variable for food industry enterprises 
OTHER dummy variable for other industries enterprises 
Environmental MONITOR number of workers involved in environmental monitoring 
efforts made (not including persons who operate the treatment facilities) 
by enterprises MANAGER number of workers who served as environmental managers 
TREAT percentage of effluent treated before discharge 
ENVLOAN environmental investment from the subsidy and loan (10,000 Chinese Yuan/a) 
OPERCOST operation costs of water treatment facilities (10,000 Chinese Yuan/a) 
SELFMONI frequency of self-monitoring (times/a) 
EPB's EFFE-FEE 
enforcement 
effective water levy on water discharged violating the applicable standards 
(Chinese Yuan/ton) 
MEET1 times for EPBs to visit enterprises to collect charges, discuss subsidies, etc.(times/a) 
MEET2 times EPBs meetings with enterprises regarding implementation of PCS (times/a) 
EPBMONI frequency of EPB-monitoring (times/a) 
Others YEAR89 dummy for data from 1989 
YEAR90 dummy for data from 1990 
YEAR91 dummy for data from 1991 
YEAR92 dummy for data from 1992 
YEAR93 dummy for data from 1993 
YEAR94 dummy for data from 1994 
YEAR95 dummy for data from 1995 
22 Since there is more than one variable that describes a factor, all these variables are obtained by doing the 
bivariate analysis. For example, when the factor of environmental protection workers is considered to have 
some influence on the compliance outcomes, there are the total number of worker involved in environmental 
protection, the number of those only involved in environmental management, and the number of those who 
have a certain level of education, etc., to choose from. In this situation, those with the largest correlation 
coefficient (with the dependent variable) were chosen to be included in the regression model. 
23 The criteria for determining size of enterprise to be either large, medium or small are not consistent across 
different industrial sectors. For this reason, the physical output was chosen to depict the effects that the size 
of enterprises might have on their environmental performance. 
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3.4.4 Hypothesis 
There are some hypotheses to be tested in the regression model: 
1. The effectiveness of the PCS (the compliance results of PCS) has a correlation 
with the compliance behavior of enterprises. 
Sub-hypothesis 
a) There is a correlation between the size of enterprises and the compliance results 
of PCS. By OUTPUT. 
b) There is a correlation between the type (i.e., state-owned or TVIEs) of enterprises 
and the compliance results of PCS. By TYPEDUM. 
c) There is a correlation between the financial status of enterprises and the 
compliance results of PCS. By LOSSDUM. 
d) There is a correlation between the industrial catalogs of enterprises and the 
compliance results of PCS. By CHEMICAL, DRUG, TEXTILE, MECH, FOOD 
AND OTHER. 
e) There is a correlation between the environmental efforts made by enterprises 
and the compliance results of PCS. There are several aspects showing the 
environmental efforts made by enterprises. First is the investment made in this 
field. ENVLOAN is used to show this effect. Second, the appropriate operation 
of the water treatment facilities is also crucial in determining the compliance 
outcomes. OPERCOST is used to depict this effect. And finally, the quality or/ 
and quantity of the personnel an enterprise devotes to environmental protection, 
and the effectiveness of their work also show the efforts made in accordance 
with PCS requirements. MANAGER, MONITOR and SELFMONI are also 
included. 
2. The effectiveness of PCS is also affected by the implementation of EPBs. 
Sub-hypothesis 
a) There is a correlation between the severity of EPBs management and the 
compliance results by enterprises. 
From the case study, it was learned that the behavior of EPBs (or the severity of 
EPBs in implementing regulation) has greatly affected the severity of the policy, and 
therefore, the enterprises' compliance outcomes. However, since the data here are all 
from one city, only one EPB was part of the study. This causes greater difficulty in 
defining a variable to represent these effects. EPBMONI, the frequency of EPB to do 
the on-site, unannounced monitoring for each enterprise per year, could be a proxy. 
And there is another variable, the EFFE-FEE (i.e., the effective levy faced by each 
enterprises), which also could be viewed as regulatory variable rather than a price 
factor. 
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b) There is a correlation between the sufficiency of support of EPBs and the 
compliance results of enterprises. 
Besides enforcement, EPBs are supposed to provide technical support and 
consultations for enterprises regarding in compliance to PCS. This is also a effect 
without direct measurements. MEET1 and MEET2 where chosen to grasp this kind of 
effects. 
3.4.5 Data Source 
All data came from the questionnaire. 
3.4.6 Regression Results 
Table 8 presents regression results using OLS, FE, and RE estimation methods. 
Results from the regression were robust to changes during the period of analysis, 
in terms of the signs and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. The adjusted 
R square for the ordinary least squares (OLS) versions of the equation is 0.336. The 
empirical analysis yield coefficients that generally support the expected outcomes. For 
example, the estimated coefficient for the number of environmental manager 
(MANAGER) has the expected positive24 effect. However, there are other explanatory 
variables whose coefficients turn out to be contrary to ones expectations. Of these, the 
dummy for the economic condition of the enterprise (LOSSDUM) is the most important. 
The rest of this section looks at the effects on the compliance outcomes of the 
various independent variables. It examines, in more detail, the coefficients of the attributes 
of enterprises (e.g. size, type of ownership); and environmental protection efforts made 
by enterprises, and management of EPBs. The section concludes with a discussion of 
what the empirical results suggest about the effectiveness of raising the fee-rate. 
Effects of the Attributes of Enterprises. Influence of the attributes of the enterprises 
such as size and type of ownership often combine to affect the compliance outcomes. 
Size of Enterprises. Usually, people think that large enterprises have better 
environmental performance because they would benefit from economies of scale, more 
chances of being chosen as regulated targets, better management practices, and better 
human resources. However, the regression results do not support this common 
perception. The coefficient of OUTPUT and its significant level show that the opposite 
holds true. 
Type of Ownership. From the regression outcomes, ownership is significantly 
correlated with compliance outcomes. The magnitude of this coefficient (TYPEDUM) 
can be interpreted to mean, on the average, that the concentration of effluent of the 
state-owned enterprises is 32% higher than that of non-state-owned ones. In turn, this 
means that the state-owned enterprises do more polluting than their non-state-owned 
counterparts. 
24 Since the dependent variable is the average concentrations in the effluent, the lower it is, the better the 
compliance outcomes. Negative coefficient sign means positive effects. 
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Such a result is interesting in light of the unresolved controversy over which part of 
China's economy, the state-owned enterprises or TVIEs (which account for large majority 
in the category of non-state-owned enterprises), contribute most to the whole pollution 
package. However, people usually think that TVIEs are more polluting because of their 
out-of-date technologies, poor management, and poor personnel qualifications among 
other reasons. 
The following factors, however, may offset the effects of the above-mentioned 
conditions. First, most of the TVIEs were built after the PCS came into being. Like 
other TVIE characteristics, (e.g. small size, market-oriented mechanism), they are more 
flexible in changing to less polluting products. The state-owned enterprises are usually 
larger in size, making it harder for them to shift to other products. Second, with soft- 
budgets, many heavily polluting state-owned enterprises without adequate pollution 
control measurements are allowed to continue their operation. Third, it seems that the 
TVIEs are more likely to get foreign investment25. They import new technologies, obtain 
better management experience, and have more capital. At the same time they are 
attractive to qualified employees who can be absorbed by jobs in the environmental 
protection field. 
All in all, the discrepancy on the effects of ownership on the compliance outcomes 
is derived from research works that have been done under different contexts and in 
different part of the country. In this survey, there are also some facts that might have 
caused bias. First, the selection of the non-state-owned enterprises might not be 
representative because it was not possible to include in the survey those enterprises 
which were not under EPB's enforcement. Unfortunately, only a small percentage of 
non-state-owned enterprises have been taken into EPBs' regulation so far. Second, the 
study site, Changzhou City, does not have many of the small paper mills owned by 
towns and villages. These mills are believed to be the most important contributor of 
COD in wastewater discharges. 
Further research on this point is still needed. 
Loss or not. While not statistically significant, the sign of the coefficient for this 
variable obviously runs counter with the information obtained from the case study, 
suggesting either the presence of collinearity or the poor-definition of LOSSDUM as a 
variable. 
As discussed in the case study report, economic loss was a prevailing phenomena 
in China in the late 1980s' and early 1990s'. At present, many enterprises still must 
recover from the economic slump. A conservative estimate describes the popularity of 
this economic loss as "1/3 (of all enterprises) is gaining, 1/3 is losing, and the other 1/ 
3 is potentially losing". An enterprise that is classified to have a potential loss may not 
be financially losing but has stock which can not cover production costs (Wu et al. 
1993). 
The "potential loss" might be unique to China, because of the special relationship 
between government and enterprises. According to the contract between the government 
and enterprises, if an enterprise suffers a financial loss, many bonuses such as the 
promotion of the director, retained profits, and wage raises may not be given. Thus, 
enterprises, especially those that are state-owned, are often reluctant to report that 
they are suffering an economic loss. 
25 Probably because TVIEs are less of a burden when foreign investors consider where their investments go in 
terms of less retired workers, medical services and housing requirements to be taken care of. 
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Table 8. Regression Results 
VARIABLE OLS FE RE 
C 4.87 5.86 5.07 
(32.651) (43.0510) (22.539) 
EPBMONI .00024 -.0206 -.0202 
(.037) (-2.431) (-2.721) 
LOSSDUM -.108 -.045 -.0348 
(-1.252) (-1.042) (-.807) 
MANAGER -.0323 .0176 .0262 
(-1.068) (.54) (.879) 
MONITOR -.0344 -.00859 -.0147 
(-2.125) (-.411) (-.804) 
MEET1 .023 (dropped) .0302 
(1.48) (.825) 
MEET2 (.098) (dropped) .0658 
(3.219) (.928) 
OPERCOST 3.12e-07 1.58e-08 1.16e-08 
(2.121) (.156) (.117) 
SELFMONI -.00026 -.00243 -.00078 
(-.894) (-4.209) (-2.521) 
TYPEDUM .323 (dropped) .349 
(2.511) (1.429) 
OUTPUT .000013 1.85e-06 4.21e-07 
(2.172) (.343) (.083) 
ENVLOAN .106 .00112 .0018 
(2.437) (.622) (.99) 
EFFE-FEE .000726 -.000245 -.000206 
(1.46) (-.701) (-.605) 
TREAT -.000309 -.000506 -.000431 
-.185 (-.591) (-.507) 
5 industrial sector dummies 
6 time dummies .2306(within) .1 992(within) 
Adjusted R-Square .3363 .0127(between) .3018(between) 
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In the data gathered, only 27.8% claimed that they are in a financial loss (Table 9). 
This could explain why such variable did not come out significant in the regression 
models. 
Table 9. Percentage of enterprises who are in economic loss from the survey data 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Average 11.4% 17.6% 27.8% 17.9% 21.7% 24% 26.5% 
State-owned 7.5% 15% 13.6% 11.1% 24.4% 26.1% 32.6% 
Non-state-owned 16.7% 20.6% 45.7% 25.6% 19.1% 22% 21.2% 
Environmental Efforts made by Enterprises. In response to PCS requirements, 
enterprises responded to the stipulations for environmental protection by: investing in 
pollution treatment facilities, which included both construction (ENVLOAN) and 
maintenance (OPERCOST), allocating an appropriate number of environmental staff 
(MANAGER), and setting up a routine monitoring program (SELFMONI) to collect data 
on the performance of the facility and to assist in environmental decision-making. 
Construction and Operation of Pollution Treatment Facilities. It is expected that with 
larger ENVLOAN and OPERCOST, compliance outcomes would be better. In other 
words, LCOD would be smaller and the signs of the coefficients would be negative. 
However, from the regression results, opposite results were obtained. Furthermore, 
these relationships were statistically significant, indicating a more complicated cause- 
effect relationship than previously thought. 
Neither ENVLOAN nor OPERCOST is exogenous to LCOD, the dependent variable. 
On the contrary, they are largely determined by it, and enterprises with large LCOD are 
more likely to become the EPBs enforcement targets26. Thus, they invest more on 
pollution control, and have larger ENVLOAN and OPERCOST. 
Size of Environmental Staff. In quantifying this variable, there are several alternatives 
to choose from - total environmental staff, sub-units such as environmental manager 
(MANAGER) and monitoring staff (MONITOR). However, only after the sub-units are 
used can significant results be obtained. 
The outcomes in Table 9 demonstrate a strong positive relationship between the 
compliance outcomes and the number of environmental managers per enterprise. If 
each enterprise increased its number of environmental managers by one, the average 
COD concentration in its discharge would decrease by 3.2%. The same result is 
applicable to monitoring staff. These results support the common observation that the 
lack of well-educated, environmental personnel constitutes a major constraint to more 
effective implementation of China's environmental policies (Qu et al. 1984; Wu 1987). 
26 Because of the inadequate management capacity, most EPBs take the heavier pollution into their 
enforcement system first. In this way, they believe they can get the optimal control outcomes with the existing 
resource constraints. 
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Although details are not reported in this report, when the number of environmental 
managers of each enterprise is divided by the number of workers, the coefficient becomes 
very insignificant, suggesting that the size of environmental staff need not necessarily 
change with the size of the enterprise. This observation has two implications: for large 
enterprises, the environmental staff does not need to maintain a certain percentage of 
its number of workers. On the other hand, small enterprises must maintain a certain 
level of environmental staff to ensure a satisfactory environmental performance. 
Enforcement by EPBs. EPBs play a crucial role in determining to what extent the 
PCS's implementation affect enterprises' behavior and compliance outcomes. The 
most obvious example is the failure of the reform in the use of the pollution fee collected 
in 1988 to achieve pre-designed goals (See Case Study). However, the implicit effects 
may be difficult to quantify. Furthermore, this survey was done in only one city, and 
involves only one EPB. Therefore, no variations could be observed in many aspects. 
There are still some variables like MEET1, MEET2 and EPBMONI which could be 
used in an attempt to depict their effects. However, from Table 9, the sign of coefficients 
of MEET1, MEET2 and EPBMONI are not as expected. The reasons for the contradiction 
are the same as those discussed in the coefficients of ENVLOAN and OPERCOST. It 
is understandable that EPBs are more likely to inspect and meet more often with heavier 
polluters. 
3.5 Effectiveness of Raising the Fee-rate 
When talking about the ineffectiveness of China's PCS, the most likely suggestion 
for this problem is: raise the fee-rate. However, it must first be determined whether the 
higher fee-rate will make a difference in terms of the compliance outcomes and by how 
much. In other words, what is first needed is to determine the price elasticity of the 
water quality of the receiving water body in terms of the discharge concentrations. 
However, an inherent problem in coming up with such an estimate is the absence of 
variation in fee-rates across the country. Furthermore, the fee-rate has been relatively 
stable since the time it was first implemented. 
The regression analysis uses a concept of "effective pollution charge" (EFFE-FEE) 
introduced by a World Bank working paper (Wang et al. 1996), which shows that the 
actual price the EPB collected for the water discharged exceeds applicable standards. 
However from the regression, the sign of this variable is not what is expected, largely 
because the enterprises "paid more than what is required". 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
PCS in China has achieved a degree of success in industrial wastewater control, at 
least in terms of encouraging enterprises to install water treatment facilities. Even though 
the proportion of wastewater being treated and the proportion of the discharged water 
meeting applicable effluent standards (about 30% and 55%, respectively) remain 
unchanged (or slightly increased) from 1989 to 1995, the progress should be regarded 
as more impressive when one considers the dramatic economic growth that took place 
over the same time period. 
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Analysis of both the case study and the survey results show that reforming the 
subsidy system and raising the fee-rate would be effective methods to improve the 
PCS's function as an economic incentive. These results justify the proposed PCS reforms 
of which the most important are the reform in the subsidy system and raising of the fee- 
rate. However, while the influence of EPBs' behavior on the compliance behavior of 
enterprises can not be analyzed through the regressions, the case study analysis strongly 
indicates that the EPBs' can affect the PCS implementation and effectiveness 
dramatically. The policy implication here is that when these kinds of reforms are being 
considered, the same attention should be given to an analysis of possible EPB reactions. 
The most important thing is probably to include the EPBs' growth plan into the PCS 
reform package. 
Results from the econometric analysis do not support the general belief underlying 
the existing practice of transferring enforcement focus from state-owned enterprises to 
non-state-owned ones. From the regression results, the non-state-owned enterprises 
have better compliance outcomes. EPBs may find it more effective if they keep pressure 
on state-owned enterprises while expanding enforcement efforts in non-state-owned 
enterprises. Obviously, a policy strategy like that may be difficult to implement considering 
the already inadequate number of EPB staff. 
China is in a transitional period from a planned economy to a market one, and with 
the increasing budget constraints, enterprises (including state-owned ones) are expected 
to become more market-oriented and may decide to make cuts in the number of 
environmental manager, a variable which has been identified as having a positive relation 
with compliance outcomes. Though the econometric analysis indicates that it is not 
necessary to keep the number of environmental managers at a given proportion of the 
total work staff, it also shows that this should be kept at a certain level. Considering that 
in China the average number of environmental managers per enterprise was only 1.85, 
China could benefit from increasing its investment in environment management education 
and training. 
For those counter-intuitive outcomes obtained from the regression analysis, even 
though some of them could be improved by redefining and remodeling, the serious 
distortions that exist in this incentive system of China will very unlikely change the 
outcome of the analysis. One implication could be that the recognition that an adequate 
understanding of the institutional context is essential in the development of a meaningful 
quantitative assessment. 
5.0 AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The analysis in this paper also reveals that the country is facing difficulties in allocating 
adequate money into environmental protection because of many competing uses. On 
the other hand, pollution control facilities built using the scarce money are subsequently 
systematically unused or under used. As shown in the case study, both enterprises and 
EPBs seem able to gain from the distorted incentives within the PCS. One question 
that must be asked is who are the losers in this situation? Also needed is further 
research on the fiscal and economic implications of the funding of the existing incentives 
to build waste treatment facilities, as opposed to an efficient incentive system for pollution 
control in China. 
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APPENDIX A 
Abbreviations Used 
PCS Pollution Charge System 
COD Chemical Oxygen Demand 
EPB Environmental Protection Bureau 
NEPA National Environmental Protection Agency 
TVIE Town and Village Industrial Enterprise 
CaO White Lime 
APPENDIX B 
Variables used in the model 
TYPEDUM dummy variable on ownership: state-owned or non-state-owned 
OUTPUT physical outputs of enterprises in 10,000 Yuan, showing the size effects 
LOSSDUM dummy variable for enterprise's economic condition, loss or not 
CHEMICAL dummy variable for chemical industry enterprises 
DRUG dummy variable for drug industry enterprises 
TEXTILE dummy variable for textile industry enterprises 
MECH dummy variable for mechanical industry enterprises 
FOOD dummy variable for food industry enterprises 
OTHER dummy variable for other industry enterprises 
MONITOR number of workers involved in environmental monitoring 
(not including persons who operate the treatment facilities) 
MANAGER number of workers who served as environmental managers 
TREAT percentage of effluent treated before discharge 
ENVLOAN environmental investment from the subsidy and loan 
(10,000 Chinese Yuan/a) 
OPERCOST operation costs of water treatment facilities (10,000 Chinese Yuan/a) 
SELFMONI frequency of self-monitoring (times/a) 
EFFE-FEE Effective water levy on water discharged violating the applicable standards 
(Chinese Yuan/ton) 
MEET1 times for EPBs to visit enterprises to collect charges, discuss the subsidies, etc. 
(times/a) 
MEET2 times EPBs meetings with enterprises regarding implementation of PCS (times/a) 
EPBMONI frequency of EPB-monitoring (times/a) 
YEAR89 dummy for 1989 data 
YEAR90 dummy for 1990 data 
YEAR91 dummy for 1991 data 
YEAR92 dummy for 1992 data 
YEAR93 dummy for 1993 data 
YEAR94 dummy for 1994 data 
YEAR95 dummy for 1995 data 
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